

1 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Personal Resume of [REDACTED]

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Received from Sergeant C. C . Smarr, Congressional  
Legislative Division, Air Force L and L, a personal resume for

[REDACTED] Sergeant Smarr indicated that this indi-  
vidual had come to their attention and had qualifications that  
might be of interest to the Agency.

SIGNED


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[REDACTED]  
Assistant Legislative Counsel

Distribution:  
Orig - Subject  
1 - Chrono  
1 - Signer's  
1 - Office of Personnel  
OLC/JGO:pj (1 April 1968)

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1 APR 1968



The Honorable George H. Mahon, Chairman  
Committee on Appropriations  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I quite appreciate the concern expressed in your letter of March 15th with regard to Henry J. Taylor's Nashville Banner item of February 19th.

The most charitable general comment I can make about the article is that it exploits and promotes ignorance.

For example, his comments regarding the operations of the PUEBLO are completely off the mark. He must know at least as much as has been officially stated but apparently doesn't believe it. As you know, the PUEBLO mission was conducted under the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She was under the overall command of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific who in turn delegated direct operational control to Commander U. S. Naval Forces Japan. The National Security Agency provided advice and guidance with regard to the technical tasks being performed by the PUEBLO. A point of interest in this connection is that I was fully aware of the PUEBLO mission as were other appropriate top officials of the Government, I was aware that the intelligence requirements involved were valid, and had been properly coordinated within the government to insure against unwarranted collection effort or undesirable duplication. I was aware as were others concerned that certain risks were involved. It was for that reason that PUEBLO had strict instructions to stay outside the claimed territorial waters of North Korea.

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This impels me to comment on the element of surprise on which Henry Taylor has chosen to hang his argument. First off, just how precise can intelligence be expected to be in predicting hostile actions? Obviously, it is to be desired that we predict exactly the what, when, where, how and why of any hostile action. This has seldom happened in the history of intelligence. One bends every effort in that direction but only rarely does one achieve the fully reliable and knowledgeable penetration capable of providing advance notice in time of the precise nature of hostile actions. This is why we spend a lot of money attempting to break into codes and ciphers. That's what NSA is for and, as Henry Taylor ought to know, it does on behalf of the whole U. S. Government in accordance with requirements and priorities established by the U. S. Intelligence Board over which I preside.

Let me add in this connection that neither the Berlin Wall nor the Dominican Republic were really the surprise some thought. In the case of Berlin it was clearly evident and predicted well in advance that the Communists intended to take drastic measures to restrict access to East Berlin. The timing was anticipated to a matter of days. Whether the means of control would be troops, wire, check points or bricks and mortar made little difference. We weren't prepared to take any step ourselves to prevent any actions to restrict access. That's what made the Communist action so galling. I think Mr. Taylor confuses dismay and surprise.

In the case of the Dominican Republic there was no surprise at all. We knew that the situation was about to get out of control. Why else did we have a Naval Task Force standing by? When it became clear that the leadership in the duly constituted government had lost its nerve, our government made the decision for which its intelligence had prepared it. The Marines were there, they were ready, they were used and another Communist take-over was prevented.

You may wish to point this out to your colleague from Tennessee along with some other examples of how intelligence pays its way. The Cuban missile crisis ranks high on the list. We knew what was happening, we knew how and where. We anticipated the when and again the government was ready and able to take action. What, I wonder, might have transpired had intelligence not discovered this scheme until the missiles were ready and trained on us?

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I wouldn't have picked Zanzibar to include in my list, but since Mr. Taylor did, I'll comment briefly. It was no surprise at all. For some time before Zanzibar was given its independence the Intelligence Community had consistently reported and predicted that the African majority, with international Communist help, would probably take over which it did. Our government knew this but was not in a position to do anything about it. I think that's the point one should consider in assessing Mr. Taylor's comments. It isn't the surprises which are so bothersome. It's the constraints of today's world that make it so difficult for our government to act on what it knows.

This brings me to another point. You will note that I used capitals in the term "Intelligence Community". I did that because I want to emphasize that it is a visible entity and a carefully coordinated one. Each element of it has a function most suitable to its peculiar capabilities. NSA is a part of that "Community". Its function in the intelligence field is to get as much information as possible [redacted]

[redacted] Like all other information, what NSA gets comes to this Agency where it is kneaded and melded into the warp and woof of the whole intelligence tapestry. All this is done in accordance with a coordinated list of intelligence objectives and the requirements stemming therefrom.

Weekly, and some times more often, the Director of NSA together with the principal intelligence officers of State, Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, CIA and the FBI meet as the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) under my Chairmanship. There our first order of business is to review events of the week in the form of a "Watch Report" which is an assessment of the indications of hostile Communist action for the coming week. We review drafts of estimates to put them in final form (last year we did 69 estimates of all sorts on a worldwide basis), we review intelligence needs in the light of their relevance to plans and decisions of the government. We review collection programs and determine who shall do what portion, what the risks and costs are, and what duplication, if any, is needed to insure accuracy and reliability. It is my job to coordinate all these things and I do it with full and unstinting support from the rest of the Intelligence Community. If there are dissents

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or disagreements, as often there may and should be, I attempt to iron these out with the Cabinet officers or Agency heads concerned. If I'm not satisfied I can and do take the matter to the President for decision. This is rarely necessary.

So, you see, Mr. Chairman, you can assure your colleague that we do have a well coordinated intelligence effort and that Henry J. Taylor's article is quite inaccurate on the subject. In fact, please feel free to show Mr. Evins this letter.

Lastly, on the matter of appropriations, your direct knowledge on this subject is more than adequate to point out the discrepancies in the figures used in the article.

You will note that in all of this I have made no mention of Mr. Taylor's comment on the Bay of Pigs or the LIBERTY. In the case of the former I think the less said the better. It was not an event for our government to be proud of on any score. In the case of the LIBERTY it should be clear to all that it was an unpredictable accident, though certainly a possibility, as was recognized and pointed out by the Defense Department before the incident. Unfortunately the warning was not received in time. This, however, is not in my opinion an intelligence matter but rather an operational one on which I do not feel free to comment.

I cannot, however, close this letter without mentioning the complete misrepresentation the article gives to the relations between the FBI and the CIA and the purposes of CIA's field offices in the United States. The CIA and the FBI work in close collaboration on matters of mutual concern, principal among which is foreign espionage. Foreign espionage against the United States obviously knows no borders. The FBI uses the information we collect abroad and we use the information the FBI collects here in the U. S. to keep ourselves as knowledgeable as possible of foreign espionage activity. When agents from abroad are known to us to be attempting to operate within the United States, we advise the FBI and collaborate with it in assessing the information. But within the U. S., they collect it and they act on it.

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I hope the above will assist you in responding to Mr. Evins and, indeed, may be of some use in expanding your own knowledge of the degree to which articles of the sort in question distort the correct picture of the activities of the Intelligence Community.

I'll be glad to provide more if you wish.

Sincerely,

/s/ Richard Helms  
Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment

OLC/GLC/pj/26Mar68

DDCI/mfb 1Apr68

DistributionL

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